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Do Sympathy Biases Induce Charitable Giving?
The Effects of Advertising Content
Abstract

We randomize advertising content motivated by the psychology literature on sympathy
generation and framing effects in mailings to about 185,000 prospective new donors in India. We
find significant impact on the number of donors and amounts donated consistent with sympathy
biases such as the “identifiable victim,” “in-group” and “reference dependence.”

A monthly

reframing of the ask amount increases donors and amount donated relative to daily reframing. A
second field experiment targeted to past donors, finds that the effect of sympathy bias on giving is
smaller in percentage terms but statistically and economically highly significant in terms of the
magnitude of additional dollars raised. Methodologically, the paper complements the work of
behavioral scholars by adopting an empirical researchers’ lens of measuring relative effect sizes and
economic relevance of multiple behavioral theoretical constructs in the sympathy bias and charity
domain within one field setting. Beyond the benefit of conceptual replications, the effect sizes
provide guidance to managers on which behavioral theories are most managerially and
economically relevant when developing advertising content.

Key Words: Charitable Giving, Sympathy Biases, Identified Victim Effect, Non-profit
marketing, Advertising, Behavioral Economics, Conceptual Replications
JEL Codes: L31, M37, M31, C99

1 Introduction
As charities face increasingly competitive fundraising environments, they have begun to
employ marketing activities to encourage donations. This has led to an explosive growth of
research in recent years on the “demand side” of charitable giving. These papers have focused on
various dimensions of charitable giving appeals such as incentives, seed money and match rates
(e.g., List and Lucking-Reily 2002, Karlan and List 2007), social comparison (e.g., Shang and
Croson 2009) and social pressure (DellaVigna et al. 2012) on donor behavior. While there is a
large volume of behavioral research in the laboratory on the how advertising content affects
outcomes of interest, there is little field based empirical research in general on the effects of
advertising content on consumer purchases in general and donation behavior in particular. Our
goal in this paper is to document and quantify the relative magnitudes of various types of
advertising appeals on donation behavior motivated by the psychology theories through large scale
field experiments.
Academic research by empirical scholars on advertising effects using field data typically focus
on estimating the relationship between the volume, frequency and timing of advertising on market
outcomes such as sales and market shares; 1 but field research on how different elements of
advertising content affects market outcomes is rare. 2 Some exceptions include Bertrand et al.
(2010), who vary advertising content in combination with interest rates and offer deadlines to
study its impact on loan take-up in a direct mail field experiment in South Africa and Liaukonyte
(2012) who codes the video content of TV ads for comparative and self-promotional advertising
and studies the differential effect of demand for OTC analgesics in the US.

The paucity of

research on advertising content effects is partly because unlike the data on the level of spend,
frequency and timing which are easily quantifiable and amenable to empirical testing, content of
See Kaul and Wittink (1995), Wind and Sharp (2009), Dellavigna and Gentzkow (2010) and Sethuraman et al. (2011)
for reviews of the empirical evidence on advertising.
2
Otherwise, research on advertising content has focused primarily on laboratory experiments. To be sure, advertising
agencies and direct marketing firms routinely do copy testing before launching advertisements or sending mailers, but
these studies are seldom designed to enable generalizable learning because they are built on context specific intuition;
few results have been reported in the literature (e.g., Stone and Jacobs 2008).
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ads vary on a large number of dimensions, and it is difficult to isolate dimensions of interest
systematically from advertisements used in the field.
Psychologists have found that emotions sometimes work better to motivate people to action
than cognition; hence treatments that generate an emotional response can be more effective in
generating donations. Sympathy is the particular emotional response triggered by another person’s
misfortune; laboratory experiments consistently show that evoking sympathy leads to prosocial
behavior and charitable giving (e.g., Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Batson et al. 1997; Coke, Batson,
and McDavis 1978).
Researchers have demonstrated framing effects called “sympathy biases” that can generate
disproportionately greater sympathy relative to the actual needs of the victims. We believe this
should translate to greater giving. Hence we consider three such sympathy biases to generate three
advertising content treatments in our experiment. They are: (1) the identified victim effect (2) the
in-group effect, (3) reference dependent sympathy effect. Sympathy can be increased by reducing
the perceived social distance from the victim (Small 2011). The identified victim effect reduces the
perceived social distance between donor and the victim by identifying an individual victim to a
potential donor; while the in-group effect reduces social social distance as the victim is from the
same in-group as the target donor. The reference dependent sympathy effect arises because
sympathy is greater if one framed a victim’s current condition as a decline from a reference
condition, rather than simply presenting the actual condition. (Small 2010).
Our fourth experimental treatment for advertising content involves a temporal reframing of
the donation. Charities often reframe an aggregate annual donation into smaller monthly or daily
amount, even though the donation itself is annual. For example, a $365 donation can be made to
appear more affordable by reframing it as $1 a day or $30 a month. Such strategies are used also
in other marketing contexts, ranging from insurance, magazine subscriptions, durable goods and
charitable donations. Gourville (1998) dubbed such temporal reframing into a small daily amount
as “a pennies a day” (PAD) strategy. However, the pennies a day framing violates an alternative
prescription based on prospect theory that one should “integrate” losses by combining them into a
2

larger amount (e.g., Thaler 1985). Thus far, there has been little research on the bounds of the
PAD strategy and whether alternative temporal framing could lead to superior outcomes. We
therefore compare donations from monthly and daily reframing.
We test these hypotheses using two field experiments in an entirely natural setting in
partnership with HelpAge India, one of India’s leading charities in the aid of seniors. In the first
and primary experiment, we tagged on to an annual new donor acquisition campaign, where the
organization sends out mailers to a cold list of around 200,000 high net worth individuals all over
India. We added an additional flyer to the regular ask used in this campaign. This flyer
randomized the contents of the ask message in line with the hypotheses we sought to test. The
magnitude of donations solicited and obtained is significant relative to incomes in India. 3 We find
economically large and statistically significant effects on both the intensive and extensive margin
for the various sympathy generation and framing effects that we tested. For the various effects we
test, the number of donations per mailer increases by 43%-155%, while donation amount per
mailer increases by 33%-110%.
It is likely that the impact of framing on sympathy and donation is very high for a cold list of
donors, because their baseline level of sympathy for the cause is likely lower. Would such effects of
framing vanish among past donors, where baseline sympathy level for the cause is already high?
To test this, our second experiment targeted a warm list of about 100,000 donors, who have
previously donated to HelpAge. As HelpAge was reluctant to conduct the full battery of
treatments, many of which had been shown to be ineffective in the first experiment, we only
experimented with a few treatments to test our conjecture that the effect vanishes for past donors.
As expected, the percentage impact on donations for our previously largest effect falls; the effect
falls from 110% to 15%. However the effects remain both statistically and economically significant.
In particular, since the baseline amount of donations from past donors is significantly higher, even

According to the mail list provider, the average annual income of the households in the mailed list is about ₹600,000
(about $10,000). The donation requested is ₹9000, about 1.5% of the annual income. The median amount donated is
₹3,000, about 0.5% of the annual income.

3
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the 15% increase due to the sympathy bias generates more in dollars than the 110% treatment
effect on the cold list. We conclude that while framing effects of advertising content have much
larger proportional impact in new donor acquisition, the economic impact in incremental absolute
amounts is very significant among both new and existing donors.
Methodologically, this paper is part of a small but growing empirical literature in marketing
using field experiments to measure advertising effects (e.g., Eastlack and Rao 1989; Lodish et al.
1995; and Sahni 2015). More broadly, this paper contributes to a research paradigm bridging
empirical work in behavioral and quantitative marketing. Behavioral marketing scholars test and
provide evidence for particular psychological theories in controlled laboratory settings. As the
focus is often on isolating and understanding the mechanism underlying the novel psychological
theories, there is limited interest on whether these effects replicate in field settings and whether
the magnitude of the effects are managerially important. Lynch et al. (2015) describe the value of
conceptual replications and replications with extensions (moderators) in behavioral work in
generating marketing knowledge. Further from a managerial perspective, there is value in knowing
the relative magnitudes of the behavioral levers suggested by different theories, so that a firm can
prioritize on which behavioral lever to use. Quantitative scholars routinely focus on relative
elasticities of alternative marketing actions on an outcome of interest using field data to aid
managers choose the most effective marketing actions. In a similar vein, this paper complements
and builds on the behavioral literature to measure the relative magnitudes of alternative
behavioral levers on outcomes of managerial interest—in this case donation behavior.
The rest of the article organized as follows: Section 2 provides industry background and
overviews of the literature. Section 3 describes the hypotheses, while Section 4 describes the
experimental setting and treatments. Section 5 describes the results and Section 6 concludes.

2 Background
A. Advertising

4

The advertising industry is a major sector in the world economy. In 2011, advertising
spending was about $147 billion in the U.S. and $490 billion worldwide. These numbers are likely
to rapidly grow as advertising is growing rapidly at double-digit rates in emerging markets such as
China and India, and now accounts for a significant and growing fraction of the economy. 4 Even
though a large fraction of that cost is incurred on media spending to deliver the message, the
effort and cost on the development of the advertising “creative” to maximize advertising
effectiveness is substantial. 5 The industry also spends considerable effort in evaluating and
recognizing the effectiveness of creative advertising ideas through high profile annual awards such
as the CLIO and Effie awards.
Despite the recognition that advertising content and creativity are critical to advertising
effectiveness, econometric research has mostly been about the link between advertising spending
on sales (see reviews of the literature in Kaul and Wittink 1995; Chandy et al. 2001). There have
also been studies in the direct marketing literature about how varying the number of
advertisements or frequency of mailings impact consumer purchases (e.g., Anderson and Simester
2004; Gonul and Shi 1998). This focus on spend, timing and frequency of advertising on sales in
econometric modeling perhaps arises from the easy quantifiability of such variables. Liaukonyte
(2012) is an exception in that she codes the video content of over 4000 TV advertisements to
distinguish between comparative and self-promotional advertising and studies the impact on
demand in the US OTC analgesics market.
Research related to advertising content has generally been done by consumer psychologists
who have shown systematic effects of advertising content on cognition, affect and purchase
intentions in the laboratory. However there has been little effort on replicating these effects in field
settings (Chandy et al. 2001); further, we do not know whether the effects are large enough to be
China’s advertising spend in 2011 is estimated to be $54 billion and forecast to be $64 billion, an annual growth of
16.9%. Overall, the Asia Pacific region had advertising spend of $175 billion with annual growth of 10.2%. See Group M
report (http://www.aaaa.org/news/agency/Pages/120511_groupm_forecast.aspx).
5
The industry had traditionally bundled its creative and media services and hence share of spend on creative is not
available. (See Silk and Berndt 2003)
4
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economically important. 6 We note that many advertising agencies do test alternative advertising
concepts for effectiveness in on-field testing but the insights from such concept tests are hard to
generalize because they do not vary content systematically in a theoretically grounded manner. 7
Bertrand et al. (2010) test the effectiveness of a of number of non-informative advertising cues and
prices on loan uptake from a credit card lender using a direct mailer based randomized field
experiment. Our work is similar in its focus on understanding relative magnitudes of different
advertising content effects. In terms of contrasts (apart from the obvious difference in empirical
contexts), their focus is on testing the economic magnitudes of ad content relative to price effects,
while we test the relative magnitudes of a set of well-recognized sympathy biases documented in
the psychology literature to measure the relative economic importance of these theories for
managers in inducing sympathy and charitable giving.
Our paper is also related to the literature on field experiments in advertising. In a landmark
set of field experiments, Eastlack and Rao (1989) report the effects of a number of treatments:
marketing budgets, media type and mix, creative copy, and target audience on factory shipments
of various products at the Campbell Soup Company. Lodish et al. (1995) report a meta-analysis of
advertising experiments using split cable, where the only difference between the experimental and
treatment group was on the TV advertisements they saw. Sahni (2015) use online field experiment
to test for alternative mechanisms by which the temporal spacing of advertising impacts sales;
while Bart et al. (2014) use field experiments to study for which types of products mobile display
advertising favorably impacted attitudes and purchase intentions.

B. Charitable Giving
Charitable giving constitutes a significant portion of the GDP of countries. Americans gave
more than $306 billion to charity in 2007, or approximately 2.2% of gross domestic product

Levitt and List (2007) provide many reasons for why the laboratory findings need to be validated on the field.
Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) recently study how matching advertising to web content and the level of obtrusiveness
impact purchase intent through data from a large scale field experiment.
6
7
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(AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy 2008). Despite the recession, Americans gave more than $290
billion to charity in 2010, a growth of 3.8% from 2009 (AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy 2010).
Individual giving accounted for 73% of this total, while foundations accounted for 14%, bequests
for 8%, and corporations for 5%. Almost 70% of U.S. households report giving to charity. Even
though the volume of giving is large, inter-charity competition for donations is substantial with
over 800,000 charitable organizations in the United States alone. Increasingly, non-profit
organizations are adopting marketing and targeted advertising techniques used by the for-profit
sector to obtain funds for their causes. Watson (2006) estimated marketing spend at large U.S.
non-profits at $7.6 billion based on IRS exemption data.
Despite the larger need for charitable giving in developing countries, individual giving
constitutes an insignificant share in these countries. For example, even though India’s giving
totaled close to $5 billion in 2006 (about 0.6 percent of India’s GDP), 8 individual and corporate
donations constitute only 10% of charitable giving, with over 90% of the sector funded by
government and foreign organizations. In fact, nearly 65 percent of the sector funds come from
India’s central and state governments with a focus on disaster relief. Given the massive inequalities
and the enormous needs of the poor and disadvantaged in emerging economies, the ability to
understand the persuasive impact of communication to increase individual giving is of great social
importance.
Relative to research focused on demand for goods that improve one’s own welfare, there is
limited research on “demand” for spending on others’ welfare (Bendapudi at al. 1996; Andreoni
2006). The field of charitable giving in economics has recently seen a surge in the use of
randomized field experiments (see List 2011 for a survey), but most studies are focused on price
and incentive effects on charitable giving (e.g., List and Lucking-Reiley 2002). In the context of
blood donations, Lacetera et al. (2011) show that economic rewards increase blood donations and
change their timing of donations; but they also find that a surprise reward for donations reduce
Countries like Brazil and China have smaller non-profit sectors at 0.3 percent and 0.1 percent, but are growing. But
this is cold comfort given the enormous needs of the poor and disadvantaged in India.
8
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future donations, relative to giving no reward. Academics have rarely used randomized field
experiments to study the persuasive effects of advertising content in natural settings. Other
behavioral work on charitable giving include: Soetevent (2005) and, who shows that revealing the
identity of givers increasing donations suggesting social effects. Landry et al. (2006) find that
lotteries increase giving, but surprisingly the attractiveness of the fund raiser is at least as
important as the economic incentive in persuading people to give. Shang and Croson (2009) show
that providing social comparisons of giving impact donation behavior. DellaVigna et al. (2012)
test the role of altruism relative to social pressure in charitable giving.
Research in laboratory settings have tested how the framing of asks impact fundraising (e.g.,
Ferraro et al. 2005; Gourville 1998). Fishbein’s (1967) behavioral intentions model has been
frequently used to model donation behavior (see LaTour and Manrai 1989). Recently Small and
colleagues (e.g., Small and Lowenstein 2003, 2005; Small 2010), among others have focused on
developing psychological theories that inform how generation of sympathy for other people and
worthy causes affect donation behavior. We leverage on these theories for our hypotheses.

3 Hypotheses
Our first four hypotheses are based on framing effects from the literature on sympathy biases
and the fifth is based on temporal reframing of monthly versus daily ask for an annual donation.
Of the four sympathy bias hypotheses, the first three are related to how social distance impacts
sympathy; the fourth addresses the sympathy bias due to reference dependence. We discuss each
of the hypotheses in turn.
A. Identified Victim Effect
The death of one Russian soldier is a tragedy; the death of millions is a statistic--Joseph Stalin
If I look at the mass I will never act, if I look at the one I will-- Mother Teresa
Schelling (1968) first proposed and demonstrated that an identified victim evokes greater
emotion and donations than a statistical victim. As Slovic (2007) notes, people seem to care
8

deeply about individuals, while numb to the sufferings of many. As the quotes above suggest,
Mother Theresa and Joseph Stalin both seemed to have an intuitive grasp of this—perhaps the
only area in which they agreed on!
There are a number of anecdotal examples related to the identified victim hypothesis. An oftcited example is that of the child, ‘‘Baby Jessica,’’ who received over $700,000 in donations from
the public, when she fell in a well near her home in Texas in 1987 and received access to a trust
fund of $800,000 when she turned 25 (CBS News 2011). Donors contributed over $48,000 to save a
dog stranded on a ship adrift on the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii (Song, 2002). Yet, charities
struggle to raise money to feed the famished, ill and homeless --- in both developed and developing
countries. In essence, when an identifiable victim is made into a cause, people appear to be more
compassionate and generous; yet they give relatively little to so-called statistical victims, facing
enormous needs.
Based on a dual deliberative (cognitive) and affective (emotional) process model of cognition
(e.g., Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Kahneman and Frederick, 2002, Small and Lowenstein, 2005)
argue that identifiable victims reduce social distance and thereby generate more sympathy because
they invoke the affective (emotional) system (e.g., Small and Lowenstein 2005), while statistical
victims invoke the deliberative (cognitive) system. The affective mode also dominates when the
target of thought is specific, personal, and vivid as happens when we identify victims (Sherman,
Beike, and Ryalls, 1999), but the deliberative mode is evoked by abstract and impersonal targets.
Some scholars have argued that the identified victim effect is plausibly due to human
sensitivity to proportions rather than absolute numbers (e.g., Friedrich et al., 1999; Jenni and
Loewenstein, 1997).

Ten deaths concentrated in a small neighborhood of hundred people will

evoke much greater consternation than ten deaths across a large city of a million people. The
identified victim is an extreme example where by making the individual the cause, the reference
group size is reduced to the victim. With a victim proportion of 100%, maximum sympathy is
evoked. But others have shown that identification is critical, in that individuals gave more to help
an identifiable victim than a statistical victim, even when controlling for the reference group (e.g.,
9

Small and Loewenstein 2003) and Kogut and Ritov 2005a). Kogut and Ritov (2005b) found that a
single, identified victim (identified by a name and face) elicited greater emotional distress and
more donations than a group of identified victims and more than both a single and group of
unidentified victims.
In this paper, we specifically test the hypothesis that a single identified victim generates more
donors and donations, relative to a group of unidentified victims.
B. The In-group versus Out-Group Effect
The in-group effect suggests that potential donors are likely more sympathetic and give more
to victims who share similarities with them because of reduced perceived social distance. The
literature on social identity provides the foundation for the argument. Social identity is commonly
defined as a person’s sense of self-derived from perceived membership in social groups. Tajfel and
Turner (1979) developed the concept to understand the psychological basis for intergroup
discrimination. Social identity has three major components: categorization, identification and
comparison. Categorization is the process of putting people, including ourselves, into categories;
for example, labeling a person as Chinese, Black, female, or lawyer are all different ways of
categorization. Categorization also defines our self-image. Identification is the process by which we
associate or identify ourselves with certain groups. We identify with in-groups, and do not identify
with out-groups. Finally, comparison is the process by which we compare in-groups with outgroups, creating a favorable bias toward the in-group.
Overall, categorization of others as belonging to an in-group arouses feelings of greater
closeness and responsibility, and augments emotional response to their misfortune through greater
sympathy (Brewer and Gardner, 1996; Dovidio et al. 1997) and willingness to help (Dovidio, 1984;
Dovidio et al., 1997). For example, a bystander is more likely to offer help in an emergency
situation (including natural disasters) if the victim is perceived as a member of the same social
category as herself (Levine et al. 2002; Levine and Thompson, 2004). Cuddy, Rock and Norton
(2006) find that in the aftermath of the Katrina hurricane in the US where a majority of black
10

victims were affected, Blacks/Latino felt more sympathy for the victims compared to whites and
vice versa. Sturmer, Snyder and Omoto (2005) found that homosexual volunteers were more likely
to help homosexuals with AIDS than heterosexual volunteers. Kogut and Ritov (2007) find in lab
experiments that Israeli students felt more empathy for a single Israeli victim of the Tsunami. Yet,
they also report higher willingness of white Jewish students to contribute to a black Jewish child
of Ethiopian descent compared to a white Jewish child. The students were white and the authors
argue that the higher empathy for black Jews is probably a sense of responsibility for “in-group”
people who are suffering. (Chen and Li, 2009) also find in lab experiments that participants are
more altruistic towards an in-group match.
We wish to note that the in-group effect does not occur only with respect to sympathy
generation and charitable giving. It is also applicable in commercial advertising situations, where
the goal is to persuade the target to buy a product or service for oneself. Evans (1963) showed
that customers are more likely to buy insurance from a salesperson similar in age, religion, politics
and even cigarette smoking habits!
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that an in-group victim generates more donors and
donations, relative to an out-group victim.
C. Out-group “Identified Victim” versus “Unidentified” Group
As discussed above, research has demonstrated that sympathy would be greater (1) for an ingroup individual relative to an out-group individual; and (2) an identified individual victim than a
group of victims. But how does an identified out-group individual fare relative to the group? To
the best of our knowledge, there is no research on the strength of the identified victim effect
relative to the in-group out-group effect. While we have no apriori hypothesis on which effect is
stronger, we test the relative magnitudes of the effects in this paper.

11

D. Reference Dependent Sympathy
Our final sympathy bias hypothesis is based on the “reference dependence sympathy” effect.
When a major disaster happens, there is large outpouring of sympathy and substantial donations
are made. Private donations averaged USD 1839 per person for Hurricane Katrina, and as much as
USD37 per person for 2005 Kashmir earthquake, which was not very much covered by mass media
(Spence 2006). Yet donations for AIDS victims amount to about USD 10 per victim. Yet the
magnitude of the problem of AIDS, malaria, famine and unsafe water is far more substantial. Over
660,000 people die from AIDS, malaria, famine, and unsafe water per month; and that monthly
number is close to double the number of lives lost as a result of the Asian Tsunami, Hurricane
Katrina, and the earthquake in Kashmir.
What explains the differences in sympathy and giving behavior? Why do we feel more
sympathy for those who lost their homes due the housing bust than for the chronically homeless?
The literature on reference dependence based on prospect theory suggests a possible explanation.
Victims of chronic conditions maintain a constant-state of welfare but victims of events have
suffered a loss in welfare. People value not an absolute amount, but rather gains and losses relative
to a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Small (2010) shows that reference dependence
is not only supported in the context of one’s own utility, but also applicable to sympathy
generated for others. She finds that reference-dependent judgments and decisions are a function of
emotional responses to changes in others welfare. When judgments are made toward a pallid
target, the emotional mechanism ceases to exert influence; therefore, others’ losses hurt more than
their chronic conditions.
E. Temporal reframing: Monthly versus Daily Ask
Marketers temporally reframe the amount of an annual donation into smaller monthly or
daily amounts, even though donation itself is annual. Such strategies are used in a variety of
contexts, ranging from insurance, magazine subscriptions, durable goods and charitable donations.
A $360 annual insurance premium or donation to NPR seems more affordable when framed as less
12

than $1 a day. Gourville (1998) dubbed such temporal reframing into a small daily amount as “a
pennies a day” (PAD) strategy.
Standard economic theory would suggest that mere temporal reframing should not affect
behavior. Different presentations of the same stimuli-- in this case, the same physical cash flows,
should not alter donor behavior (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic 1988). Gourville therefore
proposes a two‐step consumer decision‐making process of (1) comparison retrieval and (2)
transaction evaluation to explain why PAD strategies may be effective. He demonstrates in
laboratory experiments that the PAD framing of a target transaction systematically fosters the
retrieval and consideration of small ongoing expenses as the standard of comparison, whereas an
aggregate framing of that same transaction fosters the retrieval and consideration of large
infrequent expenses. Since most individuals indeed perform many small transactions routinely, this
difference in retrieval makes it more likely that the individual will more favorably evaluate and
comply with the smaller transaction.
However, prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and its derivative mental accounting
(Thaler 1985) would predict that the PAD strategy would backfire by magnifying the perceived
cost of the donation or spend. Their recommendation to “integrate small losses” is based on the
idea that an individual would rather than experience many small costs, with each cost assessed at
the steepest and most painful part of the prospect theory value function, prefer to experience one
larger loss taking advantage of the flattening value function for increasingly larger losses.
Hence, would the $360 transaction be perceived more favorably if temporally reframed as $30
per month or less than $1 per day? This would depend on what type of small transaction would
be considered more normal or less painful: ongoing monthly payments such as utility bills or
rentals or daily spend such as for a cup of coffee or tea? If compliance is easier for monthly
payment, where people do not have much discretion, as opposed to daily spend where there is
discretion, it is possible that a monthly framing might be more effective. Such a framing has not
been subject to empirical testing. We therefore do not have a strong a priori hypothesis about
which framing will lead to more donors and donations; we treat this as an empirical question.
13

4 The Primary Experiment: New Donor Acquisition
The Setting
The aged are a growing population worldwide as life expectancy increases. While there are
safety nets like social security and Medicare in the developed world to support the elderly in their
old age, these mechanisms are not developed in countries like India and the primary source of
support for the elderly is the support from the savings of the elderly and support from the joint
family. With growing economic opportunities, the young migrate from their traditional homes in
villages or set up nuclear households, leaving the elderly increasingly abandoned. Worse, the aged
are abused with children taking control over the aged parents’ property and financial resources
and then abandoning them. Given the magnitude of the problem, the Indian Government recently
passed a law providing for imprisonment of children neglecting elderly parents. 9

Nevertheless,

there is great need for societal support of the elderly, especially when the children do not have the
means to support even themselves. India has currently 90 million elderly, of whom about over 7
million (7.8%) require some form of societal support (Rajan 2006).
HelpAge India was founded in 1978 as a secular, not-for-profit organization registered under
the Societies' Registration Act of 1860 to provide relief to India’s elderly through various
activities. Focus areas include advocacy for elders’ rights, healthcare, social protection, shelters
and disaster mitigation. 10 Our investigation is around one HelpAge social protection program
called “Support a Gran.” In this program, elderly destitutes are adopted by HelpAge and provided
with basic food, minimal clothing and necessities and a small amount of discretionary cash on a
monthly basis. The “Support a Gran” donations are considered “restricted gifts” in that funds
raised for this program can only be used for this program.
Our experiment on behalf of “Support a Gran” was done around an annual fundraising
campaign of HelpAge in March 2011. This fundraising campaign coincides with the Hindu festival
The laws are similar in spirit to laws in developed world designed to prevent neglect of children.
HelpAge India Brochure accessed March 1, 2012 from website http://www.helpageindia.org/pdf/ OrganizationalBrochure.pdf
9

10
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of Holi in March, a period of celebration of the triumph of good over evil, and considered a time
for doing good and giving. It is also fortuitously close to the annual tax filing deadline of March
31, which perhaps serves as another incentive to “give.” The appeals are targeted to a “cold”
mailing list of 184396 high net worth individuals in India in order to acquire new donors.
Appeals to cold mailing lists tend to have very low response rates; typical response rates at
HelpAge have been around 0.1%. With giving per donor averaging around ₹3000, 11 the low
response rates of about 0.1%, implies that actual money raised per mailing is only around ₹3.
With costs of the campaign averaging around ₹6 per mailing, the campaign is considered as a lossleader to acquire new donors with propensity to donate, who can be more efficiently reached in
subsequent mailings to “active” (hot) donor lists or “dormant” (warm) donor lists. In standard
marketing parlance, this campaign is part of the acquisition cost of new donors that is worth only
because there is a lifetime value for each acquired donor through subsequent donations. Our
experiment imposed little incremental cost to HelpAge, except the insignificant cost of printing a
small color flyer and including it in addition to the standard one page appeal sheet.
Experimental Treatments
As described earlier, we test hypotheses related to the following four psychological effects: (1)
identified victim (2) in-group versus out-group victim (3) reference dependence sympathy and (4)
temporal reframing--daily versus monthly ask. We provide the copy of the flyer we used in one
condition (Individual-Ingroup-Loss-Monthly) below.
We explain how the flyer was modified for other 11 treatment conditions. We operationalize
the test of the identified victim effect using two different types of treatments: an individual (I) and
group (G) condition. See stylized examples of the individual and group condition below. The areas
marked in bold are the text which change for different conditions (apart from appropriate change
of pronouns and names in the rest of the text).

11

The exchange rate in May 2011 averaged ₹44.93 (Indian Rupees) for $1 (U.S. Dollar). (www.xrate.com)
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In the individual condition, we describe an identified individual (Sushila in the example)
along with her photograph, while in the group condition we describe the victims as group of four
women (who are shown in a picture collage) and describe the group. 12 We implement the in-group
and out-group treatment as sub-treatments within the individual condition: As Hindus are the
overwhelmingly majority community in India and Christians form a very small minority, we use a
Hindu woman (Sushila) for the in-group treatment. For the out-group treatment, we use a
Christian woman belonging to the Anglo-Indian community (Shirley Barrett). The individuals
pictured had to be real beneficiaries with real stories of the non-profit as per the ethical guidelines
of the organization. We could not therefore merely change the names of the beneficiaries with the
same image. We discuss a subsequent robustness check using an M-Turk experiment to rule out if
the attitude to the charity changed due to differences in the images in the in-group-outgroup
condition among Hindu respondents.

While the individual treatment uses a Hindu and Christian woman as victim (the religion is not mentioned, but can
be inferred from their names), the group treatment simply describes a group of four women, without mentioning
religion. While we could have mentioned they were Hindu or Christian even in the group condition and obtained a fully
crossed design, HelpAge did not consider it appropriate to mention religion in the flyer. Further not mentioning religion
in the group condition made it in some ways more comparable to the individual treatment where religion is not
mentioned, but only (potentially) inferred by the reader from the name.

12
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Individual Condition
Photo of
Sushila

Sushila worked as a school teacher and retired comfortably. But she became
destitute when her husband passed away and other family members refused to support
her.
Support a Gran has helped Sushila meet her basic needs of food, clothing and shelter in
her time of need. Today in her seventies, she leads a dignified life.
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps Sushila
and people like her live a life of dignity in their golden years.

Group Condition
Photo
Collage of
four
unnamed
ladies

These ladies share a common story. They worked as school teachers and
retired comfortably. But then they became destitute when their husbands passed away
and other family members refused to support them.
Support a Gran has helped them all meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter in
their time of need. Today in their seventies, they lead a dignified life.
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps these
and other people like them a life of dignity in their golden years.

We implement the reference dependent sympathy treatment as follows. For the loss condition,
we highlight the fact that the individual concerned had lived an independent life earlier as a school
teacher and retired, before she became destitute. In a lab experiment, to create the contrasting
chronic treatment, we could have stated that “Sushila has led a life of deprivation all her life.”
However, as this was a natural field experiment, HelpAge policy would not allow for any kind of
deception or falsehood in messaging. Hence we chose an "uncertain" reference treatment, where we
omit mentioning about her past life. So we dropped the first line: "Sushila worked as a school
teacher and retired comfortably."

The uncertain treatment started with the following sentence:

“Sushila became destitute when her husband passed away…” Similarly, the group treatment also
dropped the reference to the past and simply said: “These ladies share a common story. They
became destitute, when their husbands passed away…”
We implement the monthly-daily temporal reframing treatment as follows. While everyone is
given an amount of ₹9000 to anchor as the amount needed to support one person over a year, that
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same amount is framed as ₹750 a month for the monthly condition and ₹25 a day for the daily
condition. 13
In the control condition, HelpAge sends its routine flyer—a one page sheet requesting for
donation. In each of the treatment conditions, in addition to the routine flyer, an additional one
page flyer—described above was sent. All of the flyers are presented in the online appendix.
Experimental Design
Within the individual treatment, we follow a full factorial design on the in-group-out-group,
reference dependence (loss/uncertain) and temporal reframing (monthly/daily) ask conditions.
Thus we have 2×2×2=8 conditions in the individual treatments. As we explained earlier, within
the group treatment, we do not providing any identifying characteristics including religion—hence
we do not have an in-group and out-group condition in the group treatment. So we only have the
remaining 2×2=4 conditions within the group treatment. Finally, we have a control condition,
where we do not send the additional flyer at all; this is what HelpAge would have done in the
absence of our experiment. Thus in all, we have 8+4+1=13 treatment conditions.
The full set of treatments is listed in Table 1. The mnemonics provided will serve to identify
treatments in a meaningful manner.
*** Insert Table 1 here***
We randomly assign names on the mailing list roughly equally to 12 treatments and leave a
slightly larger number of names for the control treatment. The exact number of mailings for each
treatment is reported in Table 2 along with the descriptive statistics. 14
*** Insert Table 2 here***

As a price reference, a regular cup of coffee at India’s largest coffee chain Café Coffee Day costs ₹40. In that sense, it
satisfies the “pennies a day” logic of a routine and ongoing daily expense.
14
To assess the effectiveness of the randomization, we check whether the number of mailings is roughly equal across the
main observable we have in the mailing list: the different states of India. Indeed the assignments are roughly equal for
all treatments at the level of each state.
13
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5 Results
Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics associated with each of the treatment cells in Table 2. Roughly
14000 people were assigned to each treatment condition, while about 15,500 were assigned to the
control condition. We report three outcome metrics for each treatment: (1) donation rate, i.e., %
of mailings that generated a donation; (2) donation amount per mailing (₹/mail); and (3)
donation amount per donor (₹/donor), i.e., donation amount, conditional on giving.
The highest donation rate and ₹/mail is for the Individual-In-group (Hindu)-Loss-Monthly
(IHLM) condition. This condition generated 3.3 (0.36/0.11) times the donation rate as the control
condition. Further the ₹/mail in this condition is 3.78 (16.28/4.30) times the amount generated in
the control condition. In contrast, the worst performing Group-Loss-Daily (G_LD) condition
produced only 59% of donors and raised only 60% of ₹/mail relative to the control. In general, the
group mailer is not only ineffective, but in combination with the daily ask framing performs
substantially worse than the control condition. Overall, these results suggest that relatively minor
variations in advertising content significantly affect persuasion and charitable giving.
Tests of Hypotheses
We test our hypotheses about the persuasive effects of alternative treatments by comparing
(1) the donation rate and (2) ₹/mail across the relevant treatments. An additional question is
when there is an increase in ₹/mail, whether it is only due to a higher donation rate or whether
individuals who donate also feel more sympathy and give more. For this, one cannot simply
compare ₹/donor, i.e., donation, conditional on giving, because when the more effective treatment
generates more donors, the marginal donors are innately less interested in the cause and are
therefore likely to give less. To make an apples-to-apples comparison, we can rank the donors in
descending order of their donations within each treatment and do a paired test of donation
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amounts for a donor of given rank. 15 The logic is that if treatment A generates more sympathy, a
donor of a given rank subject to treatment A should give more relative to an identically ranked
donor subject to treatment B. 16
A. Identified Victim Effect
Figure 1 shows the results for the identified victim effect. Panel A compares the donation
rates across the individual and group conditions. The average donation rate in the individual
condition is 0.24%, while it is only 0.09% for the group condition and the difference is significant
(p<0.05). Thus the donation rate for the individual treatment is 2.55 times the donation rate in
the group treatments.
Panel B compares the ₹/mail. Not only is the donation rate higher in the individual condition
the donations raised per mailing is also higher. While, the average donation per mailing is ₹8.83 in
the individual condition, it is only ₹4.20 in the group condition. This ratio of 2.1 shows that a
charity more than doubles donation dollars by recognizing the identified victim sympathy bias in
making its appeals.
Panel C graphs the ratio of individual to group donations of identically ranked pair of donors.
There are 51 donations in the group condition and 260 donations in the individual condition.
However the number of mailers in the individual condition is (roughly) double the number of
mailers in the group condition. Given the percentile discussion in footnote 14, this translates to
comparing the 51 ranked donations in the group condition against the top 51 odd ranked
donations in the individual condition. All of the 51 ratios are at or above 1, suggesting that the
identified victim effect not only causes more donors to give, but also increases the giving among
Comparing donations of persons of identical rank is valid only if we have identical number of mailings in the different
comparison treatments. Otherwise, one will have to compare donors of identical percentiles rather than ranks.
16
However there may be other possibilities for the donation decision process. As an example, the additional donors for
the more effective treatment may be systematically wealthier and therefore give more, unrelated to their level of
sympathy. As we do not have demographic information on the donors, we are unable to rule out this explanation by
checking whether there are any systematic differences in donor demographics for the different treatments. We hope
future research can address this issue. We thank a reviewer for raising this possibility.
15
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those that give. The effect is statistically significant; the mean of the ratio is 3.6 and the 95%
confidence interval of (3.05, 4.16) clearly excludes 1.
B. In-Group versus Out-group Identified Victim
Figure 2 shows the results of the tests for in-group versus out-group. From Panel A, we see
that the donation rate in the in-group condition is higher at 0.28%, relative to the out-group
condition at 0.19%. Thus, the number of donors increase by 42% with an in-group individual
relative to the out-group individual. The difference is statistically significant at the 95% level.
Note that, the average individual effect of 0.24%, reported in Figure 1 is the average of the ingroup and out-group effect.
From panel B, we see that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹11.29 for the in-group condition,
relative to ₹6.38 for the out-group condition thus generating 77% more donations. Comparing the
increase in donation rate of 43%, and the increase in donations of 77%, we can conclude that not
only does an in-group lead more donors to give, those donors also give substantially more to ingroup victims.
Panel C show that conditional on giving, identically ranked individuals in the in-group
condition, give more than the donors in the out-group condition. As roughly identical number of
mailers was sent in the in-group and out-group conditions, we directly compare the donations of
the same rank. There are 153 in-group donations and 107 out-group donations. We therefore
compare the top 107 ranks in both the conditions. Only two of the 107 pairs have ratios less than
1. The effect is statistically significant; the mean of the ratio is 2.61 and the 95% confidence
interval of (2.40, 2.82) clearly excludes 1.
One concern here is that even though our potential donor base is predominantly Hindu, there
are also Christian and Muslim potential donors in the sample. Even though we do not have access
to the religion information of the potential donor database, the email list provider indicates that
Hindus consisted of about 90% of the sample, Muslims about 7%, Christians about 2% and others
about 1%. This implies that our estimates of the ingroup and out-group donation and giving rates
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and the differences are potentially biased. In the appendix we show mathematically that the
difference in giving rates when the exact identity of the potential donor is known will be larger
relative to the estimates we obtain where some of the potential donors are also from the outgroup.
Thus the current estimates of the difference between in-group and outgroup giving are an
underestimate. We report robustness and mechanism checks around the in-group result using a
survey based experiment in Section 6.
C. Out-group “Identified Victim” versus “Unidentified” Group
Figure 3 compares the out-group “identified victim” effect against the “unidentified” group.
From panel A, we see that the average rate of donations in the identified out-group condition is
higher at 0.19%, relative to the group condition at 0.09%, Overall, the number of donors can be
increased by 110% with an out-group identified individual relative to an unidentified group,
suggesting that the identified victim effect is stronger than the in-group effect in inducing
sympathy and giving. The difference is clearly statistically significant (p<0.05).
Not only is the donation rate higher. From panel B, we see that that the identified out-group
condition generates 52% more donations; ₹/mail is ₹6.38 for the out-group condition, relative to
₹4.29 for the group condition.

Roughly equal number of mailers was send to the out-group and group conditions. So we
directly compare donations of a given rank. Given 107 donations from the outgroup condition, and
51 donations from the group condition, we compare the top 51 pairs of donations from each
condition. Only one of 51 pairs has a lower ratio than 1. The effect is statistically significant; the
mean of the ratio is 2.04 and the 95% confidence interval is (1.80, 2.28), excludes 1.
D. Reference Dependent Sympathy
Figure 4 shows the tests for reference dependence sympathy by comparing the loss condition
against the uncertain condition. From panel A, we see the donation rate for the loss condition is
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higher at 0.23%, relative to the uncertain condition at 0.15% (p <0.05). Overall, the number of
donors was higher by 51% in the loss condition.
Panel B shows that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹8.37 for the loss condition, relative to ₹6.28
for the uncertain condition. Thus the loss condition generates 33% more in terms of funds raised.
Panel C also shows that conditional on giving, identically ranked individuals in the loss
condition give more than the donors in the uncertain condition. We had 187 donations in the loss
condition and 124 donations in the uncertain condition. Only 4 out of 124 pairs have a ratio less
than 1. The mean of the ratio is 1.97 and the 95% confidence interval is (1.81, 2.14), excludes 1.
A potential alternative explanation for the greater giving in the loss condition could be that
school teachers may be an in-group with respect to the donors. We note that the socioeconomic
status of the potential donors is much higher than those of school teachers and therefore school
teachers are an unlikely in-group for these potential donors, and possibly an out-group in terms of
socioeconomic status. Nevertheless, the issue needs further exploration in future field research.
E. Temporal Reframing: Monthly versus Daily Ask
Figure 5 compares outcomes for the monthly versus daily asks. From panel A, we find that
that the donation rate is higher in the monthly condition at 0.24%, relative to the daily condition
at 0.14%. Thus, the monthly condition increases donation rate by 71%. The effect is statistically
significant (p<0.05).
From panel B, we see that the ₹/mail is also higher at ₹9.10 for the monthly condition,
relative to ₹5.47 for the daily condition. Thus the monthly condition also leads to 66% more funds
raised. Overall, in contrast to recent support for the pennies a day framing effect, we find that
monthly temporal reframing actually leads to better persuasive outcomes.
Panel C demonstrates that conditional on giving, donors on average do give more in the
monthly condition. We had 216 donations in the monthly condition and 115 donations in the daily
condition. None of the 115 pairs have a ratio less than 1, suggesting that the monthly reframing
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leads to more robust and higher donations compared to daily reframing. The mean of the ratio is
3.69 and the 95% confidence interval is (3.17, 4.2), which excludes 1.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
Thus far, we analyzed the data---one pair of treatments at a time. We now analyze the
experimental data through two multivariate regressions that controls for simultaneous variations in
multiple treatments: a logistic regression on donation choice and a tobit regression on donation
amounts. We use a tobit regression, because donations are left censored at zero. The results are
reported in Table 3.
The logistic regression results report both the coefficient estimates and the odds ratios. The
individual coefficient is positive and significant (p<0.01). This represents the individual-outgroup
condition in the regression, and shows that the individual-outgroup condition more than doubles
the odds of donation (odds ratio=2.1), over the group condition. The in-group condition further
increases the effectiveness of the outgroup condition relative to the group condition by about 40%
(odds ratio 1.41). We note that in combination, the individual-ingroup condition increases the
odds of donations three times relative to the group condition. This can also be directly checked by
replacing the “individual” variable with “outgroup” variable in the logistic regression. Thus the
identified victim effect is substantial; even an identified out-group victim overwhelms giving for a
group of victims.
Further, the results show significant effects of reference dependence, with the loss condition
increasing the odds of donations by 51% relative to the uncertain condition. Finally, temporal
reframing affects donations, with monthly ask increasing the odds of donations by 71%.
The tobit regression results show that our treatments significantly affect the donation
amounts. Specifically, we find that the in-group identified victim treatment (captured by the
Individual+Ingroup coefficient) raises ₹4851 per donor more than the group treatment. Even the
out-group identified victim raises ₹3095 more than the group treatment. Reference dependence in
the form of the loss conditions generates ₹1786 more than the uncertain condition. Finally, the
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monthly temporal framing leads to greater giving of ₹2438 relative to a daily temporal frame.
Overall these results show strong statistical and economic significance of advertising content
effects. 17

6 Robustness Checks
We conduct two robustness checks. The first seeks to assess the robustness of the ingroupoutgroup hypothesis. The second addresses the question that while we have demonstrated large
effects of advertising content for a cold list, consistent with sympathy biases, whether such effects
are likely to hold also for a warm list where people have already shown an interest in the cause.
The In-group- Outgroup Effect Replication Using Survey based Experiments
We demonstrated in the field experiment that an ask around an in-group person (Hindu
woman where the cold list is about 90% Hindu) leads to higher donation rates and donation
amounts than an out-group person (Christian woman). Nevertheless, our result is open to other
alternative interpretations. For example, it might be the case that Christian women may be
considered to be wealthier on average and may be seen to have less “needs” and therefore may
generate less donations. If indeed it is the outgroup effect driving the lower donations, it must be
the case that potential Christian donors are more likely to donate to the Christian subject and less
to the Hindu subject. However, given the low number of potential Christian donors this is hard to
test within our field sample.
We therefore conducted a survey based experiment to assess this question. First, we
conducted a survey through M-Turk on Indian respondents where we showed the same flyer as in
our cold list experiment (with individual condition, loss condition and monthly condition) but one

As the group condition did not have ingroup and outgroup sub-conditions, we cannot identify an interaction effect of
ingroup-outgroup with the individual condition beyond the main effects of individual and ingroup from the experimental
data.. Other interactions with respect to loss or month conditions were not significant. We therefore report only the
main effects. In general, logistic regressions have some level of interactions built in due to their intrinsic nonlinearity and
this may explain why the loss or month interactions were not significant.
17
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group receiving the flyer with the Hindu woman (Sushila) and the other group receiving the flyer
with the Christian woman (Shirley). After reading the flyer, the respondents were asked about
their likelihood of giving (1-10 scale), whether they had given in the past, their religion, education
and income. Unfortunately, the respondents through M-Turk were disproportionately Hindu.
Given our interest in getting additional Christian respondents, we augmented our sample through
an email mailing list of Christian respondents from an Indian direct marketing company (Yellow
Umbrella) and did the identical survey with these respondents, randomizing for in-group and outgroup treatments.
The results from the survey are reported in Table 3a-b. Table 3a provides the descriptive
statistics across the four groups: (1) Hindus asked to donate for Sushila (in-group); (2) Hindus
asked to donate for Shirley (outgroup) (3) Christians asked to donate for Sushila (out-group); (2)
Christians asked to donate for Shirley (ingroup). Hindus say they would give more overall in the
sample, though their income and educational conditions are not higher. Past giving is roughly
similar across all treatments, except for Christians asked to give to Shirley. What is clear is the
base rates of giving are higher for ingroups relative to outgroups for both Hindus and Christians.
This is particularly interesting given that the past giving is much lower for Christians facing the
Shirley treatment (ingroup) compared to Christians facing the Sushila treatment (outgroup).
Table 3b reports results of an OLS regression on the likelihood of giving (a 10 point scale)
with controls for past giving and education to test the ingroup-outgroup effect. These results show
that the ingroup effects are indeed statistically significant for both Hindus (p<0.1) and Christians
(p<0.05). Not surprisingly, Past giving is overall very significant and higher levels of education
lead to higher giving. Income was highly correlated with education and created multicollinearity
issues, hence we dropped income from the final regression we report (education had better
explanatory power). This survey-based experiment result not only replicates the ingroup effect for
Hindus from the field experiment, but also supports the ingroup effect for Christians, giving us
greater confidence in our in-group-out group comparison result.
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Next, we explore whether the difference in giving for ingroup and outgroup is caused by
differences in attitudes towards the charity rather than differences in sympathy. 18

We ran a

second M-Turk experiment randomizing the ingroup and outgroup condition across Hindu
respondents and asked them to rate the charity on a 10 point scale on three dimensions adapted
from Webb et al (2000). The three questions are: (1) HelpAge India serves a good cause; (2)
HelpAge India is a well-managed charity; (3) I have a positive image of HelpAge India.
The regression results are reported in Table 3c. For all three questions, the Sushila (ingroup)
variable is insignificant, indicating no statistically difference in donor’s perceptions of the charity
based on the ingroup or outgroup treatments. Thus the difference in likelihood of giving does not
appear to rise due to differences in how the charity is perceived based on the target recipient
featured in the charity.
*** Insert Table 3a-c here***
Raising Donations from Past Donors
Thus far, we have demonstrated that advertising content has large effects on both donation
rates and amounts raised. The odds of giving increased from as low as 51% between the loss and
uncertain condition tests for the reference dependence sympathy effect to as high as 300% for the
in-group relative to the group condition for the identified victim effect.
We conjectured that sympathy biases may have relatively strong impact in the context of new
donations, because the baseline levels of sympathy might be lower. But the effects of sympathy
bias on donations may be more muted when the base levels of sympathy are higher. To test this,
we decided to test if the effects of sympathy bias may be replicated among past donors, for whom
the baseline sympathy for the cause must be higher. 19

We thank a reviewer for the suggestion.
Another possibility is that past experience with HelpAge has reduced the uncertainty (lower variance) about the
charity; hence the framing effects may have limited impact on the warm list. Whether learning on selection accounts for
18
19
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Experimental Treatments
HelpAge conducted multiple mailings to their warm list of past donors. One such mailing was
in November 2011 around the festival of Diwali—the festival of lights---which is celebrated almost
all over India. While Diwali has religious legends associated with the ascendancy of good over evil,
it also coincides with the end of the Indian harvest season, and again has been associated with gift
giving and charitable giving.
HelpAge was reluctant to test the entire set of previous experimental treatments on their
warm list of past donors, given that the results appear to favor monthly ask, and loss condition for
reference dependence. However, they were curious about understanding the boundaries around the
identified victim effect. We therefore tested the individual and group treatments from the earlier
experiment (with loss framing and monthly ask), where the photos and text communicated either
the suffering of the individual or group. To this, we add a third treatment, where we showed a
group photo, but in the text we used a story that used the example of a particular individual. The
goal was to test whether the text associated with the individual evoked the identified victim
sympathy bias, while the group picture communicated that this is a problem for a larger group.
We show the treatment associated with the Group Photo-Individual Text condition below.
Group Photo-Individual Text Condition
Photo Collage
of four
unnamed ladies

These ladies share a common story. For example, Sushila worked as a school
teacher and retired comfortably. But then she became destitute when her husband
passed away and other family members refused to support her.
Support a Gran has helped people like Sushila meet their basic needs of food, clothing and
shelter in their time of need. Today in their seventies, they lead a dignified life.
Your tax deductible donation of ₹9000 a year (that is just ₹750 a month) helps Sushila
and people like her live a life of dignity in their golden years.

Experimental Design

the differences in rates of giving across the warm and cold list would be an interesting possibility for future research. We
thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the learning explanation as a possibility.
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The three treatments (as described above) and the number of mailings for the three
treatments and descriptive statistics are listed in Tables 4a and 4b. We also report on the past
giving of donors which are standard in the direct marketing literature such on recency (# years
since past donation), frequency (#times donated in last 5 years) and monetary value of donations
in the past (average value of previous donations) in each treatment; we will use them as controls
in addition to the treatments in analyzing the donations. The mnemonics provided serve to
identify treatments in a meaningful manner. We randomly assign names on the mailing list to the
three treatments, but given that we expected the group condition to be the least effective, we sent
only half the number of mailings to this condition. The exact number of mailings for each
treatment is reported in Table 4b along with the descriptive statistics. As expected, the giving
with this warm list average about 1.2%, about four times higher than with the cold list. The ₹ per
mailing also was higher at ₹45. This validates the use of cold lists to generate donors (even at a
loss) in order to be able to more efficiently raise funds in subsequent fundraisers targeted to past
donors.

*** Insert Table 4 here***
Results
Figure 6 reports the results in terms of donation rates and ₹/mail under the three conditions.
As before, we replicate the result that the individual condition (with both individual photo and
text) generated more donors and higher amounts of donations relative to the group condition
(with both group photo and group text). The difference in donor rates (1.33% versus 1.14%)
however is smaller than with the cold list of new donors, and is significantly different only at
p<.01. ₹/mail is also higher at ₹53.10 for the individual condition, relative to ₹50.7 for the group
condition, an increase of 4.7%. To our surprise, we found the group photo-individual text
condition generated worse outcomes than the pure group condition. Donor rates were only 0.95%,
while the ₹/mail is also substantially lower at ₹37.40. We speculate that having the individual text
as an example where otherwise the photo and initial introduction are about the group potentially
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destroys the fluency of the message, by mixing up a group story with an individual example,
rather than generating a bump up in donation rates relative to the group message.
The results of the logistic and tobit regressions for donation choice and donation amounts are
reported in Tables 4b and 4c respectively. Indeed the results reported under model 1 in Tables 4b
and 4c are both qualitatively and quantitatively identical to the paired treatment comparison
results discussed in the previous paragraph. In Model 2, we report the results of the logistic and
tobit regressions, controlling for donor heterogeneity exhibited through past donation choices
described earlier. The effects of the experimental treatments continue to be virtually identical in
magnitude relative to the regressions without the controls, reflecting the fact that our assignment
to treatments was random; at the very least this should give faith in the quality of our random
assignment. In terms of substantive insights from the control variables, we find that recent and
more frequent donors are not only more likely to donate, but also donate more. We see that higher
monetary value of past donations has a negative impact, but only significant at p<0.1). While we
cannot explain the negative impact, we note that even if considered significant, the economic
magnitude is small. A ₹1000 increase in total past giving reduces the odds by only about 1% (odds
ratio of .99), which is much smaller than the impact of other variables. However larger monetary
amounts do predict greater current dollar value of donations as expected. 20
Thus we conclude that the effects of sympathy bias affect donation behavior even among past
donors, who are already sympathetic to the cause, but the framing effects are attenuated relative
to the cold list setting. Given that the number of donors and the amount of money raised with the
warm list is about 10 times greater, the 16% increases in donors and the 4.7% increase in the
amount of money raised is comparable in economic magnitude in terms of incremental donors and
money raised with new donor acquisition. Hence we conclude that effects of sympathy biases
continue to remain economically significant even among warm donors.

We tested for interactions between past giving and treatment. We did not find significant interactions for donation
rates. In the tobit regression on donation amount, we found negative interactions with recency and positive interactions
with monetary value for the treatments.

20
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7 Conclusion
This paper investigated the persuasive effects of advertising content on target outcomes, in
the context of fund raising through the use of large scale field experiments. Our experimental
treatments were guided by the psychological literature on sympathy biases and framing effects.
Broadly, we find that even minor variations in the persuasive message have large and dramatic
impact on donor behavior, both in terms of the donation rates and amounts raised. The results are
particularly dramatic and stark, given that there are no differences in incentives, match rates or
social pressure, which have been the focus of much previous research. Minor differences in
language, lead to fairly large differences in outcomes. More specifically, our key findings are as
follows:
1. Framing has large effects on donor response both in terms of donation rates and donation
amounts (₹/mail). Among potential new donors, donation rates increase from as low as 51%
between the two reference dependence conditions to as high as 300% for the in-group relative
to the group condition. The sympathy bias and framing effects are much larger among new
donors relative past donors in percentage terms, but as the giving rates are much higher
among past donors, the incremental money raised in dollar terms is larger with the warm list.
2. We find significant evidence of the identified victim effect; an individually identified victim is
likely to generate over two and a half times more donors and over twice the donations relative
to an unidentified group of four victims.
3. When the identified victim is from an in-group (Hindu majority in India), the treatment
generates substantially more donors and donations than when the identified victim is from an
out-group (Christian minority). An in-group victim increases donation rates by almost 50%,
and nearly doubles funds raised. Even an identified out-group victim does better relative to
unidentified group of victims.
4. We find support for reference dependent sympathy. When victims are described as currently
destitute, but previously well-off, they are likely to generate 50% more donors and 33% more
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average donations than someone who is destitute, but the past was left un-described. This
supports the hypotheses that the chronic poor are less likely to elicit sympathy than someone
who suffered a change—i.e., fell into poverty in old age.
5. We find no support of the “pennies a day” hypothesis. The monthly temporal framing
generated 71% more donors and 66% more donations than the daily framing, even when the
daily frame was in terms of an amount that is smaller than the price of a coffee in urban
India.
6. The ratio graphs of the amount donated across conditions for the corresponding rank of the
give (panel C) in Figures 1-4 show that the strength of each effect tested is extremely
powerful—to the best of our knowledge, such a result has never been presented in the
behavioral literature. This representation based on a paired test is more convincing that a
mere means and proportion test that is typically presented in the behavioral literature.
Empirical research using field data on advertising has focused primarily on how advertising
spend and timing affect market outcomes; there has been little systematic research on how
advertising content affects outcomes. Our results show that varying advertising content through
theoretical results identified in psychology has economically significant impact on the market
outcomes in real world settings. This is particularly important as these treatments add little
incremental cost, yet have dramatic impact on market outcomes.
There are of course a few caveats that we should highlight. First as with all experimental
research, the effect sizes are likely a function of the particular treatments. For example, the loss
treatment can be made stronger by making the losses of the victim more vivid; or we could make
the ingroup effect stronger by priming religion more explicitly, and/or emphasizing geography
(state or city) or linguistic connections. Similarly the effect sizes can vary across contexts. For
example, our donation request is in the context of a chronic poverty condition, but if the ask is
around a disastrous event (e.g., earthquake, tsunami etc.) to help destitute seniors, the effect sizes
will be likely larger. Further, the cold list donation was done during tax time and the Holi
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holidays. The overall giving may be more muted during other seasons. As we show in the paper,
the effect sizes are different for cold lists versus warm lists--—a managerially important
distinction. The differences in framing effect sizes by treatment and context is similar to variations
in price and advertising elasticities documented in empirical work across categories and in different
shopping and media contexts, that typically gets summarized through meta-analysis over time
(e.g., Tellis 1988; Kaul and Wittink 1995). Finally, one issue in managerial use of these results is
whether the effects of sympathy biases might wane over time with repeated use on in competitive
settings, if all fundraisers apply such ideas. As with much psychological research on framing effects
such as loss aversion, endowment effects etc., we believe these effects are unlikely to fade due to
repeated use or use by competitors, but these issues are worthy of testing in future work.
We hope our research continues to bridge the gap between behavioral and quantitative
marketing research not just in the area of advertising, but also more broadly by triggering research
agendas around field validation and conceptual replications for various behavioral theories by
quantitative empirical scholars. While behavioral research focuses on identifying new theories and
exploring the theoretical mechanisms underlying the psychological effects, empirical research by
quantitative marketers and economists is more focused on measuring the magnitude of effects and
relative effect size of alternative marketing levers in naturally occurring data. In practice,
naturally occurring empirical data do not have the variations to measure psychological effects and
therefore there is often the question of whether behavioral effects identified in the lab can be
observed in real world settings and how economically meaningful the effect sizes are. This study
demonstrates that experimental treatments based on well documented theories in psychology can
be implemented in the form of experimental treatments in practical and natural field settings with
a very light touch and still produce large economically relevant effects. Such research focused on
measuring relative effect sizes of previously identified behavioral effects in natural settings should
be valuable for not only quantitative marketers and economists interested in whether psychological
theories matter in the field, but also for managers interested in choosing among the
recommendations from behavioral theories as marketing levers.
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Appendix
Proposition: The difference in giving rates for ingroup and outgroup victims when the potential
donor list consists only of ingroup members will be greater than or equal to the difference in giving
rates for ingroup and outgroup victims when the donor list has a mix of ingroup and outgroup
members with ingroup members being a majority in the mailing list.
Let α and (1 − α ) be the proportion of ingroup and outgroup potential donors respectively
in the mailing list. Let the giving rate towards ingroup and outgroup victims be x and β x
respectively, where β ≤ 1 by the logic that the outgroup donation rate would be at most as large
as the ingroup donation rate. The table below clarifies the giving rates for ingroup and outgroup
victims among potential donors from the ingroup and outgroup.

Size

Potential
Donor Base

α

Ingroup

(1 − α )

Outgroup

Giving rate to

Giving rate to

Ingroup Victims

Outgroup Victims

x

βx

βx

x

If the donor sample only had the ingroup (i.e., α = 1 ), then the difference in the giving
rate between the ingroup and outgroup victims would be x − β x =(1 − β ) x .
When the donor list has a mix of ingroup and outgroup members whose group membership
cannot be identified, the estimated giving rate for ingroup victims will be: α x + (1 − α ) β x . The
estimated giving rate for the outgroup victims will be: αβ x + (1 − α ) x . The difference in estimated
giving

rate

between

the

ingroup

and

outgroup

victims

will

be

α x + (1 − α ) β x − (αβ x + (1 − α ) x ) = (1 − β ) x (2α − 1) . When the ingroup members are in the majority,
i.e., α ≥ 0.5 , 0 ≤ (2α − 1) ≤ 1 . Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Identified Victim: Individual versus Group Effect
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Figure 2: In-group versus Out Group Effect
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Figure 3: Out-group versus Group Effect
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Figure 4: Reference Dependence: Loss Versus Uncertain Reference Effect
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Figure 5: Temporal Framing: Monthly versus Daily Ask
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Figure 6: Past Donor Experiment
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Table 1: New Donor Experiment: Experimental Treatments
Treatment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Mnemonic
IHLM
IHUM
IHLD
IHUD
ICLM
ICUM
ICLD
ICUD
G_LM
G_UM
G_LD
G_UD
Control

Individual/
Group
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Group
Group
Group
Group
NA

In-group /
Out-group
Hindu
Hindu
Hindu
Hindu
Christian
Christian
Christian
Christian
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
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Reference
Loss/Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
Loss
Uncertain
NA

Monthly/
Daily
Monthly
Monthly
Daily
Daily
Monthly
Monthly
Daily
Daily
Monthly
Monthly
Daily
Daily
NA

GPGT

Table 2a: New Donor Experiment: Summary of Experiment Outcomes
Treatment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Mnemonic
IHLM
IHUM
IHLD
IHUD
ICLM
ICUM
ICLD
ICUD
G_LM
G_UM
G_LD
G_UD
Control
Overall
Average for 12
Treatments

# Mailed
13826
13832
13823
13669
13832
13805
13820
13690
13859
13682
13876
13682
15506
184396
165982

%Donate
0.36%
0.27%
0.34%
0.14%
0.34%
0.22%
0.14%
0.08%
0.11%
0.12%
0.06%
0.07%
0.11%
0.17%
0.19%

₹/Mailing
16.28
9.29
11.96
7.63
12.24
6.45
2.93
3.88
3.77
6.59
2.59
3.85
4.30
6.98
7.29

₹/Donor
4501
3474
3516
5561
3603
2967
2134
4886
3480
5341
3996
5339
3958
3993
3889

Table 2b: New Donor Experiment: Logistic Regression on Donation Choice

Individual
Ingroup
Loss
Month
Intercept
N
Base

Logistic Regression on
Tobit Regression on
Donation Choice
Donation Amounts
Coefficient
Odds
Z Coefficient
t-stat
(std. err)
Ratio
(std. err)
0.743***
2.10
4.37
3095***
4.08
(.170)
(759)
0.358***
1.41
2.84
1756***
2.97
(.126)
(591)
0.411***
1.51
3.55
1786***
3.34
(.116)
(535)
0.535***
1.71
4.55
2438***
4.46
(.118)
(546)
-7.52***
-43.42
-47312***
-18.50
(.173)
(2557)
165982
Treatment is: Group-Uncertain-Daily Condition
***p< 0.01
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Table 3a: Survey Based Experiment: Descriptive Statistics
N

Likelihood to
Give (1-10)

Std.
Dev

Past
Give Education

Hindu-Sushila

139

7.50

2.48

0.24

4.14

4.14

Hindu-Shirley

155

6.97

2.53

0.27

4.12

4.08

Christian-Sushila

57

5.98

2.99

0.26

4.35

5.54

Christian-Shirley

41

6.98

2.74

0.17

4.20

4.15

Income

Table 3b: Survey Based Experiment-1: Likelihood of Giving
Coefficient
(std. err)
0.527*
(.305)
1.002**
(.533)
0.991***
(.403)

Coefficient
t-stat
(std. err)
Hindu Sushila
1.73
0.503*
(.291)
Christian Shirley
1.88
1.063**
(.515)
Hindu
2.720
1.053***
(.388)
Past giving
1.566***
(.292)
21
Diploma
1.731**
(.850)
Bachelor’s degree
2.047***
(.634)
Graduate Degree
2.078***
(.649)
intercept
5.979***
17.31
2.807***
(.345)
(.712)
N
392
392
Base Treatment is: Christian-Sushila
Base level of Education is less than 12th Grade
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

t-stat
1.73
2.07
2.72
5.36
2.04
3.23
3.20
3.94

A Diploma is 3 year vocational degree from a technical training institution that is entered after 10th grade. It is lower
in prestige than a three or four year Bachelor’s degree that is entered after 12th grade.
21

48

Table 3c: Survey Based Experiment-2: HelpAge Evaluations
Good
Cause

WellManaged

Positive
Image

Coeff
Coeff
Coeff
(t-stat)
(t-stat)
(t-stat)
Sushila
0..093
0.035
0.062
(.46)
(.17)
(.31)
Past giving 0.691***
0.683***
0.364
(3.13)
(2.99)
(1.64)
Intercept
7.792***
7.531***
7.966***
(35.82)
(33.53)
(36.28)
N
252
252
252
Education is not statistically significant, but increases standard errors, so they are not included.
The coefficients on Sushila remain qualitatively similar without Past giving as covariate.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
.
Table 4a: Past Donor Experiment: Descriptive Statistics on Past Behavior and
Experiment Outcomes
Treat- Description
ment (Mnemonic)
1
Individual
PhotoIndividual Text
(IPIT)
2
Group PhotoIndividual Text
(GPIT)
3
Group PhotoGroup Text
(GPGT)
Overall

#
Mail
44000

Recency

₹/
%
₹/
Donate Mail Donor
1.325% 53.10
4007

0.62

Past
Freq
.920

₹ Past
Amt
3066

43999

0.63

.923

2939

0.954% 37.40

3918

22000

0.63

.927

2980

1.136% 50.74

4465

109999

0.63

0.92

2981

1.14% 45.03

4069
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Table 4b: Past Donor Experiment: Logistic Regression on Donation Choice

Individual Photo Individual Text
(IPIT)
Group Photo- Individual Text
(GPIT)
Donation in Past Year?
(Recency)
# Donations in 5 years
(Frequency)
Total Donations in 5 Years
(Monetary Value in thousands)
Intercept

Model 1
Estimate
Odds
(Std. Err)
Ratio
0.16*
1.16
(0.084)
-0.18**
0.83
(0.079)

Z
2.04
-2.19

Model 2
Estimate Odds
(Std. Err) Ratio
0.15*
1.16
(.08)
-0.018**
0.83
(0.075)
0.61***
1.84
(0.123)
0.74***
2.09
(0.02)
-4.11e-3*
0.99
(2.51e-6)
-6.15 0.002
(0.121)
109999
Condition

-4.46***
0.011
-70.21
(0.063)
N
109999
Base Treatment is: Group Photo-Group Text (GPGT)
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Table 4c: Past Donor Experiment: Tobit Regression on Donation Amount

Individual Photo Individual
Text (IPIT)
Group Photo- Individual Text
(GPIT)
Donation in Past Year?
(Recency)
# Donations in 5 years
(Frequency)
Total Donations in 5 Years
(Monetary Value)
Intercept

Model 1
Estimate
(Std. Err)
799*
(431)
-1042**
(450)

t-stat
1.85
-2.32

N
N (Left Censored at 0)

108746

108746

N (Uncensored)

1253

1253

Base Treatment is: Group Photo-Group Text (GPGT) Condition
*p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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1.99
-2.22
4.99
38.41
-1.85
-50.46

Model 2
Estimate
t-stat
(Std. Err)
739*
1.68
(440)
-1094**
-2.36
(459)
1354***
2.39
(567)
4274***
27.86
(153)
0.02***
3.29
(0.006)
-39429***
-35.63
(1106)
13850***
(328)
109999

-34178***
(914)
-34178***
(914)
109999

Sigma

-37.49

Z

